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TRUVACE RECORD VERSION record: TRV-2026-2059 version: 1 kind: certified reason: Certified into the record timestamp: 2026-10-21T01:09:32.540693Z status: published lens: p_space sector: education headline: Trust of Pre-Service Teachers in Government Response to Gen AI Generated Deepfakes dek: This study examined the perceptions of pre-service teachers regarding the Spanish government’s response to the misuse of generative artificial intelligence (generative AI) for creating disinformation, as well as the mitigation of risks associated with deepfakes produced using these digital tools. A quantitative methodology was employed, involving 133 pre-service teachers pursuing a Primary Education degree in the Region of Murcia (Spain) who participated voluntarily. The results revealed low levels of confidence… gain_title: (none) problem_title: Among 133 Murcia pre-service primary teachers, confidence in the Spanish government's response to generative AI disinformation and deepfake risks was low, leaving a trust gap in how these threats are managed. trace_subject: (none) gain_reading: (none) gain_evidence: (none) problem_reading: Among 133 Murcia pre-service primary teachers, confidence in the Spanish government's response to generative AI disinformation and deepfake risks was low, leaving a trust gap in how these threats are managed. problem_evidence: The results revealed low levels of confidence in the government’s response to these online threats. quick_read: A quantitative study surveyed 133 volunteer students in a Primary Education degree program in the Region of Murcia, Spain. It asked how they viewed the national government's response to generative AI being misused to produce disinformation and deepfakes. The finding matters because future teachers are expected to help pupils judge political information online, and their low trust may affect how education authorities act. The sample is small and regional, and a minority who trusted the government more were more focused on AI-amplified manipulation campaigns, so the picture is not uniform. limitation: The evidence comes from a voluntary sample of 133 pre-service primary teachers in one Spanish region, so it may not represent other teachers, students or regions. tag: Evidence-backed problem key_points: The study covered pre-service teachers' views of the Spanish government's response to generative AI disinformation and deepfakes. | The sample was 133 voluntary participants studying Primary Education in the Region of Murcia. | Overall confidence in the government's response was low. | A minority showed greater confidence and focused more on AI-amplified manipulative disinformation campaigns. | The authors call for higher education research on digital citizenship competencies to identify political manipulation. rundown: The research used a quantitative design with voluntary participants drawn from one degree program in a single Spanish region. Its subject was the perceived adequacy of government action against deepfakes and the misuse of generative AI for disinformation. Results showed generally low confidence in official responses. A smaller group expressed more confidence and gave more attention to the risk that generative AI could be used to amplify manipulative disinformation. The authors suggest that linking trainee teachers' knowledge of the issue to their view of the government's response could prompt educational authorities to set boundaries on the weaponisation potential of deepfakes. They also call for further work on digital citizenship competencies, including identifying digital political manipulation, evaluating source motivations, and adopting preventive tracking mechanisms. sources: - peer_reviewed | Education Sciences | https://doi.org/10.3390/educsci16101753 | 2026-10-19 prev: 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
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