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TRV-2026-0137Certified recordPeer-reviewed

Model Context Protocol (MCP) at First Glance: Studying the Security and Maintainability of MCP Servers

Although Foundation Models (FMs), such as GPT-4, are increasingly used in domains like finance and software engineering, reliance on textual interfaces limits these models’ real-world interaction. To address this, FM providers introduced tool calling—triggering a proliferation of frameworks with distinct tool interfaces. In late 2024, Anthropic introduced the Model Context Protocol (MCP) to standardize this tool ecosystem. With SDK downloads surpassing twenty five million per week and 86% of enterprises using mo…

Health · The Trace — both readings · certified 2026-07-13 · v1 · article view · machine-readable

Current reading — gain

Open-source MCP servers demonstrated strong health metrics despite rapid adoption with SDK downloads surpassing twenty five million per week.

Current reading — problem

7.2% of evaluated MCP servers contained general vulnerabilities and 5.5% exhibited MCP-specific tool poisoning, part of eight distinct vulnerabilities largely distinct from traditional software flaws.

What this doesn’t fix

Findings are limited to open-source MCP servers and may not generalize to proprietary enterprise deployments that represent majority of usage.

Evidence

Reader signal

How should this claim be treated?

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Truvace Impact Record TRV-2026-0137, v1: “Model Context Protocol (MCP) at First Glance: Studying the Security and Maintainability of MCP Servers.” Truvace, 2026-07-13. /record/TRV-2026-0137 (accessed at citation time). sha256 829de285e9ee0988

Calibration history

Every change to this record since certification, in the open. None yet — the reading has held since it entered the record.

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