aceREGULATING DEEPFAKES IN NIGERIA: ASSESSING THE ADEQUACY OF THE EXISTING CYBERCRIME FRAMEWORK
Generative artificial intelligence now enables the cheap fabrication of audio, images and videos of real people. Nigeria has been the scene of a range of such abuse, from a cloned-voice clip preceding the 2023 elections to deepfakes of the President and of Peter Obi from 2024 to 2026. This article examines the adequacy of Nigeria’s cybercrime law to regulate deepfakes, based on four stages of their life: acquisition, synthesis, dissemination and consequence and four criteria of evaluation: rule clarity, institut…
Nigeria's cybercrime framework offers no definition of synthetic media, no offence of non-consensual synthesis, no takedown duty and no rules for authenticating electronic evidence, leaving deepfake victims with limited protection.
The assessment is a qualitative doctrinal analysis of legal texts, and coverage of sexual deepfakes is described only as arguable, so the conclusions rest on interpretation rather than measured enforcement outcomes.
Evidence
- Peer-reviewedInternational Journal of Science and Research Archive2026-10-15
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Truvace Impact Record TRV-2026-1672, v1: “REGULATING DEEPFAKES IN NIGERIA: ASSESSING THE ADEQUACY OF THE EXISTING CYBERCRIME FRAMEWORK.” Truvace, 2026-10-17. /record/TRV-2026-1672 (accessed at citation time). sha256 886892939865ce4b…
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