TruaceTracing the truth around AIThursday, August 27, 2026
TRV-2026-0889Certified recordPeer-reviewed

Forensic analysis of dominant versus non-dominant handwriting: Statistical and machine learning insights

Systematic, paired quantitative evidence on how handwriting changes when the non-dominant hand is used remains limited in forensic document examination, despite its frequent relevance in cases involving disguise and authorship concealment. This study presents the first large-scale within-writer analysis examining general and individual handwriting characteristics using statistical testing and predictive modeling. Handwriting samples were collected from 94 right-handed participants, each of whom produced the same…

Crime · G Space — documented gain · certified 2026-08-26 · v1 · article view · machine-readable

Current reading — gain

Supervised logistic regression distinguished dominant versus non-dominant handwriting with 92.98% test accuracy using execution-quality features, providing quantitative benchmarks to support forensic evaluation of suspected off-hand disguise.

What this doesn’t fix

Findings are limited to right-handed writers producing the same standardized text in a controlled collection, not varied real-world disguise scenarios or left-handed writers.

Evidence

Reader signal

How should this claim be treated?

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Truvace Impact Record TRV-2026-0889, v1: “Forensic analysis of dominant versus non-dominant handwriting: Statistical and machine learning insights.” Truvace, 2026-08-26. /record/TRV-2026-0889 (accessed at citation time). sha256 4f5c688200f09cc1

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