acePatient Harm From Orthodontic Care (Part II): Incident Analysis of Contributory Factors and Perceived Avoidability of Harm
Background Patient safety, defined as the absence of avoidable harm, in orthodontics is still in its early stages of development. Knowledge on the subject is limited. Aim (1) To conduct an incident analysis, (2) to measure avoidability, (3) to investigate the relationship between contributory factors and perceived avoidability of harm from orthodontic care, and (4) to suggest methods to mitigate potential patient harm incidents. Materials and methods Data were retrospectively collected from consecutively filed o…
Researchers applied a large language model to analyze 125 compensated orthodontic cases and identified that most harms were multifactorial and largely avoidable, creating a foundation for future safety initiatives.
Analysis of 125 compensated orthodontic cases found the majority of patient harms were avoidable and driven by multiple interacting human factors such as monitoring and clinical knowledge and organizational factors such as protocols and workplace culture.
Findings are limited to approved-for-compensation claims filed with the Danish Dental Compensation Association between September 2019 and August 2024, not all orthodontic adverse events, and reflect a single national compensation system.
Evidence
- Peer-reviewedOrthodontics & Craniofacial Research2026-08-07
How should this claim be treated?
Truvace Impact Record TRV-2026-0717, v1: “Patient Harm From Orthodontic Care (Part II): Incident Analysis of Contributory Factors and Perceived Avoidability of Harm.” Truvace, 2026-08-09. /record/TRV-2026-0717 (accessed at citation time). sha256 71f8883626c43d7c…
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