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TRUVACE RECORD VERSION
record: TRV-2026-2471
version: 1
kind: certified
reason: Certified into the record
timestamp: 2026-11-11T12:03:00.271545Z
status: published
lens: p_space
sector: health
headline: Completeness, Safety, and Readability of Large Language Model-Generated Informed Consent Materials for Orthognathic and Craniofacial Surgery: A Procedure-Specific Content Analysis
dek: Background: Procedure-specific completeness of large language model (LLM)-generated orthognathic and craniofacial consent materials remains uncertain.
Methods: A fixed corpus of 132 outputs from four default/free consumer interfaces (ChatGPT, Gemini, DeepSeek and Grok; 11 procedures; three new-chat repetitions) underwent revision-stage independent scoring by three oral and maxillofacial surgeons using a locked checklist. Final outcomes used item-level two-of-three majorities. Coverage comparisons used 11 paired…
gain_title: (none)
problem_title: In a study of 132 chatbot outputs, 15 of 33 ChatGPT and 17 of 33 Gemini consent documents for jaw and facial surgery missed at least one critical item.
trace_subject: (none)
gain_reading: (none)
gain_evidence: (none)
problem_reading: In a study of 132 chatbot outputs, 15 of 33 ChatGPT and 17 of 33 Gemini consent documents for jaw and facial surgery missed at least one critical item.
problem_evidence: Outputs with at least one critical omission numbered 15/33, 17/33, 1/33 and 1/33, respectively.
quick_read: Researchers asked four free consumer chatbots (ChatGPT, Gemini, DeepSeek and Grok) to write informed consent materials for 11 orthognathic and craniofacial procedures, repeating each request three times in new chats for 132 outputs. Three oral and maxillofacial surgeons scored them against a locked checklist. Mean coverage was 77.81% for ChatGPT, 72.94% for Gemini, 83.15% for DeepSeek and 83.27% for Grok.

Critical omissions were common for two of the tools. Fifteen of 33 ChatGPT outputs and 17 of 33 Gemini outputs missed at least one critical item, versus one of 33 each for DeepSeek and Grok. Of 34 affected outputs, 28 met general-consent criteria and six met procedure-specific criteria, so the gaps often involved procedure-specific content.

The authors say aggregate coverage did not establish completeness or clinical safety. Six outputs carried incorrect or unsupported-statement flags and two carried over-reassurance flags. Patient comprehension and clinical usefulness were not tested, so the results do not show how the documents would perform with real patients.
limitation: Patient comprehension, clinical utility and the effectiveness of checklist-assisted verification were not tested, and aggregate coverage did not establish completeness or clinical safety.
tag: Evidence-backed problem
key_points: The study analysed 132 outputs from four default consumer chatbots across 11 procedures, with three new-chat repetitions each. | Three oral and maxillofacial surgeons scored the outputs independently against a locked checklist, using item-level two-of-three majorities. | Mean coverage was 83.27% for Grok, 83.15% for DeepSeek, 77.81% for ChatGPT and 72.94% for Gemini (Friedman P<0.001). | After Holm adjustment, DeepSeek covered more than ChatGPT and Gemini, and Grok covered more than Gemini. | Critical omissions appeared in 15/33 ChatGPT, 17/33 Gemini, 1/33 DeepSeek and 1/33 Grok outputs. | Six outputs had incorrect or unsupported-statement flags, two had over-reassurance flags and one failed the required format. | Mean Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level ranged from 10.22 to 13.89, above the level usually advised for patient materials.
rundown: The team used a fixed corpus of 132 outputs: four free consumer interfaces, 11 orthognathic and craniofacial procedures and three new-chat repetitions each. Three oral and maxillofacial surgeons scored every output independently with a locked checklist, and final results used item-level two-of-three majorities.

Coverage comparisons used 11 paired procedure blocks, and critical omissions were analysed with a procedure-random-intercept logistic model. Agreement between surgeons was high at item level (Gwet AC1 0.892, 95% CI 0.885-0.899) but lower for derived critical-status judgments (AC1 0.583, 0.477-0.689).

Of 34 outputs with critical omissions, 28 met general-consent or task criteria and six met procedure-specific criteria. Excluding the one format failure left the coverage comparisons unchanged. Readability comparisons were descriptive only, with mean grade levels between 10.22 and 13.89.
sources:
- peer_reviewed | Journal of Stomatology Oral and Maxillofacial Surgery | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jormas.2026.103077 | 2026-11-10
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