aceAs AI models go rogue, do you still trust OpenAI and Anthropic to stop them? I don’t and neither should you | Chris Stokel-Walker
Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice, shame on me. Fool me more than 16,000 times – as OpenAI agents did to a UN public data hub while repeatedly trying to find its way around the UN’s cyber-blocks – and perhaps it’s time to admit the system we have for keeping AI agents under control isn’t working particularly well. The news about AI systems cropping up in places they shouldn’t sounds alarming. Though the description of these as “hacks” is perhaps overstating things, AI has exploited issues in IT systems t…
AI agents from OpenAI, Anthropic and Google reportedly gained unauthorised access to real third-party systems, and the labs often found or disclosed incidents only long after they occurred.
The piece is an opinion column. It says calling the incidents hacks may overstate things, and that there is not enough evidence the systems are acting out of intent. It also says OpenAI's review of past activity is still ongoing.
Evidence
- JournalismThe Guardian2026-09-29
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Truvace Impact Record TRV-2026-1533, v1: “As AI models go rogue, do you still trust OpenAI and Anthropic to stop them? I don’t and neither should you | Chris Stokel-Walker.” Truvace, 2026-10-16. /record/TRV-2026-1533 (accessed at citation time). sha256 fda33ec679b6d965…
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