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record: TRV-2026-0421
version: 1
kind: certified
reason: Certified into the record
timestamp: 2026-07-20T10:40:20.979899Z
status: published
lens: p_space
sector: policy
headline: Disinformation, AI and regulation in Ecuador’s 2025 presidential election
dek: Introduction This research analyses Ecuadorians’ perceptions of the use of generative artificial intelligence (AI) in the dissemination of disinformation during the 2025 presidential elections. In light of the growing use of synthetic technologies in political campaigns, it examines the impact of AI on electoral integrity, public trust and the need for regulation. Methodology Mixed explanatory approach, based on two surveys ( n = 201 and n = 64), nine semi-structured interviews with experts after the elections,…
gain_title: (none)
problem_title: Ecuadorian participants perceived that generative AI was used to disseminate disinformation during the 2025 presidential campaign, that it influenced the election outcome, and that it failed to increase trust in candidates or electoral legitimacy.
trace_subject: (none)
gain_reading: (none)
gain_evidence: (none)
problem_reading: Ecuadorian participants perceived that generative AI was used to disseminate disinformation during the 2025 presidential campaign, that it influenced the election outcome, and that it failed to increase trust in candidates or electoral legitimacy.
problem_evidence: Participants perceive that AI-generated disinformation influenced the outcome of the presidential election. | The use of AI did not increase trust in candidates or in the legitimacy of the electoral process.
quick_read: Between November 2024 and July 2025, researchers studied Ecuadorian perceptions of generative AI in the 2025 presidential election using surveys, expert interviews and sentiment analysis. They found participants believed AI-generated disinformation affected the result, did not improve trust in candidates or the electoral process, and produced widespread concern, mistrust and fear.

The findings matter because they link synthetic media realism and scale to perceived risks for electoral integrity and democratic legitimacy in a specific national contest. What remains uncertain is whether perceived influence reflects measurable vote shifts, what regulatory model would be effective and enforceable, and how labelling, penalties and media literacy would be coordinated across actors.
limitation: 
tag: Evidence-backed problem
key_points: Mixed-methods study with two surveys (n=201 and n=64), nine post-election expert interviews, five pre-election interviews, and sentiment analysis of open responses collected November 2024 to July 2025. | Sentiment analysis found widespread concern, mistrust and fear about synthetic political content, plus public demand for transparency, digital literacy and institutional action. | Authors conclude solution is not banning AI but ethical regulation led by the National Electoral Council with labelling obligations, penalties and verification mechanisms.
rundown: Researchers surveyed 201 and 64 respondents, conducted 14 semi-structured interviews before and after the vote, and ran sentiment analysis on open-ended answers, analyzing data with chi-square tests and qualitative coding.

Results show broad public support for regulating AI in campaigns but ongoing debate over mechanisms, and authors argue that without a robust framework led by the National Electoral Council these technologies will continue as instruments of political delegitimisation.
sources:
- peer_reviewed | Frontiers in Political Science | https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2025.1624206 | 2025-12-17
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