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TRUVACE RECORD VERSION record: TRV-2026-0197 version: 1 kind: certified reason: Certified into the record timestamp: 2026-07-13T21:40:06.390613Z status: published lens: trace sector: crime headline: How Generative AI Empowers Attackers and Defenders Across the Trust & Safety Landscape dek: Generative AI (GenAI) is a powerful technology poised to reshape Trust & Safety. While misuse by attackers is a growing concern, its defensive capacity remains underexplored. This paper examines these effects through a qualitative study with 43 Trust & Safety experts across five domains: child safety, election integrity, hate and harassment, scams, and violent extremism. Our findings characterize a landscape in which GenAI empowers both attackers and defenders. GenAI dramatically increases the scale and speed of… gain_title: Trust and Safety defenders can use generative AI to detect and mitigate harmful content at scale and support investigations and moderator wellbeing. problem_title: Generative AI increases the scale and speed of Trust and Safety attacks and lowers barriers to creating sophisticated propaganda and deepfakes. trace_subject: generative AI impact on scale and handling of harmful content in Trust & Safety gain_reading: Trust and Safety defenders can use generative AI to detect and mitigate harmful content at scale and support investigations and moderator wellbeing. gain_evidence: defenders envision leveraging GenAI to detect and mitigate harmful content at scale problem_reading: Generative AI increases the scale and speed of Trust and Safety attacks and lowers barriers to creating sophisticated propaganda and deepfakes. problem_evidence: GenAI dramatically increases the scale and speed of attacks, lowering the barrier to entry for creating harmful content quick_read: On April 13, 2026, a peer-reviewed CHI paper reported a qualitative study of 43 Trust & Safety experts across child safety, election integrity, hate and harassment, scams, and violent extremism. It found generative AI both expands attacker capabilities and offers new defensive tools for detection and mitigation. The dual-use framing matters because it moves beyond misuse-only narratives to show how the same capability that lowers barriers to propaganda and deepfakes could also enable large-scale detection, investigations, and moderator support. Uncertainty remains because defensive benefits are largely envisioned rather than demonstrated in operational deployment. limitation: Findings are based on a qualitative study of 43 experts and include envisioned defensive uses rather than measured deployments at scale. tag: Automated dual reading key_points: Qualitative study involved 43 Trust & Safety experts across five domains. | Five domains examined were child safety, election integrity, hate and harassment, scams, and violent extremism. | Defensive uses envisioned include conducting investigations, deploying persuasive counternarratives, improving moderator wellbeing, and offering user support. rundown: The paper reports a qualitative study with 43 experts spanning child safety, election integrity, hate and harassment, scams, and violent extremism to characterize how generative AI reshapes attack and defense. Attacker empowerment is described as increased scale and speed and lower barriers to harmful content including sophisticated propaganda and deepfakes, while defender empowerment includes detection at scale, investigations, counternarratives, moderator wellbeing, and user support. sources: - peer_reviewed | Proceedings of the 2026 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems | https://doi.org/10.1145/3772318.3791363 | 2026-04-13 prev: 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
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